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Abstract— This paper studies the attack detection problem
in a data-driven and model-free setting, for deterministic
systems with linear and time-invariant dynamics. Differently
from existing studies that leverage knowledge of the system
dynamics to derive security bounds and monitoring schemes,
we focus on the case where the system dynamics, as well
as the attack strategy and attack location, are unknown. We
derive fundamental security limitations as a function of only
the observed data and without estimating the system dynamics
(in fact, no assumption is made on the identifiability of the
system). In particular, (i) we derive detection limitations as a
function of the informativity and length of the observed data, (ii)
provide a data-driven characterization of undetectable attacks,
and (iii) construct a data-driven detection monitor. Surprisingly,
and in accordance with recent studies on data-driven control,
our results show that model-based and data-driven security
techniques share the same fundamental limitations, provided
that the collected data remains sufficiently informative.
Index Terms— Data-driven security and attack detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing integration of the cyber and physical layers
in many real-world systems has led to the emergence of
cyber-physical systems security as a prominent engineer-
ing discipline, with attack monitoring forming a crucial
component. Its methods differ from traditional information
security techniques which lack an appropriate abstraction of
the physical layer [1] and are inadequate for the protection
of cyber-physical systems, where the target is often the
underlying dynamics of the physical system.
Attack monitoring methods for cyber-physical systems
can be broadly classified into model-based and data-driven
approaches. While the latter relies only on the data, generated
in the form of measurements from sensors deployed on the
physical system, the former additionally assumes knowl-
edge of the model of the underlying system. Clearly, from
the perspective of implementation, model-based monitoring
methods [2], [3] have to first contend with the difficulty
of obtaining a reliable model for the underlying system.
This is in practice achieved by system identification, for
which the available data must be adequately informative –
a requirement that is difficult to meet for complex systems.
Moreover, it is unclear if full system identification is even
necessary for attack monitoring. These considerations have
contributed to the increasing popularity in recent years of
data-driven approaches to monitoring. However, despite the
proliferation of data-driven methods for security, a detailed
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characterization of their limitations is lacking, especially
when compared to model-based methods. This letter fills
such a gap for the monitoring of linear systems.
We now provide an overview of the data-driven attack
monitoring problem studied in this letter. We consider the
following discrete-time linear time-invariant system:
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k),
y(k) = Cx(k) +Du(k),
(1)
with A ∈ Rn×n, B ∈ Rn×m, C ∈ Rp×n and D ∈ Rp×m
the system matrices, x : N → Rn the state, u : N → Rm
the (attack) control input, and y : N→ Rp the output of the
system. Further, let u = (u1, . . . , um), where uj : N→ R is
the input to actuator j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and y = (y1, . . . , yp),
where yi : N→ R is the output from sensor i ∈ {1, . . . , p}.
The attacks are modeled in the form of data injection to
the system (1), which includes a large class of attacks [2].
Thus, the system (1) is said to be under attack if u 6≡ 0. The
data-driven attack detection problem reads as follows:
Problem 1: (Data-driven attack detection) Given the
output {y(k)}k∈N, determine if the (attack) input u 6≡ 0. 
An algorithm to solve Problem 1 is called attack monitor [2].
In Problem 1, the matrices A,B,C,D of system (1), the state
{x(k)}k∈N, and the (attack) input {u(k)}k∈N are unknown.
Further, the Attack Detection Problem 1 is one of binary clas-
sification of time-series of measurements {y(k)}k∈N into the
classes {Attack, No−Attack}, where u 6≡ 0 corresponds
to the class Attack and u ≡ 0 to No−Attack. Therefore,
data-driven attack detection is essentially an inverse problem
of determining the structure of the inputs to system (1) based
on the output measurements. In this letter, we characterize
the fundamental limitations of data-driven attack monitoring
when the underlying system is linear and time-invariant.
Related work. Approaches to data-driven monitoring funda-
mentally rely on the fact that the underlying system (1) im-
poses structure on the temporal characteristics of the output
data streams. The task of a data-driven attack monitor is then
one of detecting changes in the structure of the output data
streams in the absence of a model of the underlying system
that generates them. Viewed this way, the task of data-driven
attack monitoring is closely related to outlier detection in
sensor data streams [4], [5]. Recent works have proposed
machine learning methods for data-driven attack monitoring
of cyber-physical systems, which broadly fall within the
categories of supervised [6] and unsupervised learning [7]–
[9]. While these works demonstrate performance of varying
degree in implementation, a theoretical characterization of
performance of these approaches remains elusive.
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The performance of data-driven methods relies heavily on
the quality of the available data. Therefore, an investigation
into the fundamental limitations of data-driven methods must
relate notions of performance to notions of data informativity.
In the context of system identification, persistency of exci-
tation [10] is often assumed as a precondition on the data.
In [11], the authors propose the notion of data informativity
for data-driven control [12], [13], where they characterize the
necessity of persistency of excitation for data-driven analysis
and control and show that for certain problems, persistency
of excitation is not necessary. In a similar vein, in this
letter we obtain conditions on the information content in the
measurement data in the context of data-driven monitoring.
Finally, in [2] the authors characterize undetectable attacks
for model-based attack monitoring. Other works have studied
the problem of false-data injection [14], [15], where the
objective is to inject inputs that will remain undetected by
an attack monitor. Here, we provide an equivalent character-
ization of undetectable attacks in a data-driven setting
Paper contributions. This letter contributes a characteri-
zation of the fundamental limitations of data-driven attack
monitoring, from a systems-theoretic perspective. The par-
ticular contributions and the outline we follow are detailed
below: (i) We first briefly treat the problem of attack detec-
tion in the model-based setting and develop the framework
and preliminary results that we then adapt to the data-driven
setting. (ii) We propose the notion of Hankel information
to characterize the information content in the output time
series. We then obtain a systems-theoretic bound on the
information content of the output time series generated by
a given system and the time taken to attain this bound.
(iii) We propose a data-driven attack monitoring scheme
that relies on learning the dynamics governing the features
in the output data. (iv) We provide a practical data-driven
heuristic for handling the output data for use in the attack
monitor, and characterize the length of the time horizon
for data collection to reach detection capability under the
heuristic. (v) We finally characterize attacks undetectable by
data-driven monitors.
II. DATA-DRIVEN ATTACK DETECTION
In this section, we address the data-driven attack detection
problem. The output of system (1) over a time window
{0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, for any N ∈ N, can be expressed as
y0:N−1 =
[ON CN]( x(0)u0:N−1
)
, (2)
where yr:s = (y(r), y(r + 1), . . . , y(s)) ∈ Rp(s−r+1) and
ur:s = (u(r), u(r + 1), . . . , u(s)) ∈ Rm(s−r+1), for any
r, s ∈ N such that r ≤ s. The matrices ON and CN read as:
ON =

C
CA
CA2
...
CAN−1
 , CN =

D 0 . . . 0
CB D . . . 0
CAB CB . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
CAN−2B CAN−3B . . . D
 .
Notice from (2) that the outputs over time-windows of size
N belong to the column space of
[ON CN].
A. Feature space dynamics and undetectable attacks
In the ensuing analysis, we consider the nominal system
under no attack (i.e., u ≡ 0). We now factor ON by singular
value decomposition [16] and construct S(m,nom) from the
left singular vectors of ON corresponding to the non-zero
singular values, (where m in the superscript denotes that it
is obtained from the model). Notice that Col
(
S(m,nom)
)
=
Col (ON ), and let Col
(
S(m,nom)
)
be the feature space of the
nominal outputs of (1) over time windows of size N . Since
the columns of S(m,nom) are orthonormal, they form a basis
of the nominal feature space. Then, the nominal output over
a time window {k, . . . , k+N −1} is yk:k+N−1 = ONx(k),
and it can be expressed in the feature space coordinates as
w(k) = S(m,nom)
>
yk:k+N−1 = S(m,nom)
>ONx(k).
We call {w(k)}k∈N the nominal feature vector sequence. We
note that {w(k)}k∈N is the representation of the nominal
outputs over windows of size N of (1) in the feature space
coordinates. It can be shown, for sufficiently large N , that the
nominal feature vector sequence is generated by the system:
w(k + 1) =
(
S(m,nom)
>ON
)
A
(
S(m,nom)
>ON
)†
w(k), (3)
where w(0) = w0 = S(m,nom)
>ONx(0). This forms the
content of the Theorem 2.1 below, which is proved in
Appendix I. Before stating the theorem, we recall the notion
of observability index of linear time-invariant systems, which
provides a lower bound on the size N of the time window.
The observability index of the system (1) is defined as:
ν = min {N ∈ N | Rank (ON ) = Rank (ON+j) , ∀j ∈ N} .
Theorem 2.1: (Feature space dynamics) Let ν be the
observability index of (1). For any N ≥ ν, the feature vector
sequence {w(k)}k∈N generated by the system (1) with u ≡ 0
is a solution to (3). 
Theorem 2.1 suggests the design of an attack detection
scheme that is based on verifying if the output time series
{y(k)}k∈N, generated by the system (1), can be completely
characterized by a feature vector sequence {w(k)}k∈N that is
a solution to (3). In particular, if yk:k+N−1 = S(m,nom)w(k)
for all k ∈ N, where {w(k)}k∈N is a solution to (3),
then {y(k)}k∈N is classified as No−Attack. The output
sequence is otherwise classified as Attack. We also note that
maximum detection capability is attained at time Tmsafe = ν.
Remark 1: (Undetectable attacks) We first note that for
time instants T ≤ ν, an (attack) input u0:T−1 over the
time horizon {0, . . . , T − 1} is detectable if and only if
CTu0:T−1 /∈ Col (OT ). Therefore, any (attack) input u0:T−1
for which CTu0:T−1 ∈ Col (OT ) is undetectable. However,
for attacks starting at a time instant T ≥ ν + 1 (i.e., u :
N→ Rm such that u0:T−1 = 0), not only must the outputs
yk:k+N−1 ∈ Col (ON ), they must also, for N ≥ ν + 1,
be completely characterized by a feature vector sequence
{w(k)}k∈N that is a solution to (3). Thus, an attack starting
at T ≥ ν + 1 is undetectable if and only if uT :T+N−1 ∈
Ker (CN ) for any N ∈ N.
Furthermore, if u : N → Rm is a finite duration attack
(i.e., there exists a d ∈ N such that uT+d:∞ = 0), it can
remain undetectable (i.e., uT :T+N−1 ∈ Ker (CN ) for any
N ∈ N) only if the system (1) is not left invertible [17].
This analysis is compatible with the fundamental limita-
tions derived for model-based attack detection in [2] in terms
of the zero dynamics of (1). 
B. Information bound on output time series
The preceding analysis assumes the knowledge of the sys-
tem matrix A and the observability matrix ON of system (1),
which are unknown in the data-driven setting. We instead
have access only to a finite time series of outputs over a
horizon {0, . . . , T − 1}, from which we can construct the
following Hankel matrix with a time window of size N ≤ T :
YN,T =

y(0) y(1) . . . y(T −N)
y(1) y(2) . . . y(T −N + 1)
y(2) y(3)
...
...
. . .
...
y(N − 1) y(N) . . . y(T − 1)
 . (4)
As a first step, we characterize the information bound on the
output time series for the attack detection problem via an
upper bound on the rank of YN,T . Notice that Rank (YN,T )
is a function of N,T ∈ N and the initial state x(0) (since
{y(k)}k∈N is generated by the underlying system (1)). We
introduce the notion of Hankel information defined below:
Γ ({y(k)}k∈N) = sup
N,T∈N
{Rank (YN,T ) : N ≤ T}, (5)
as the measure of the information content in the
output data {y(k)}k∈N. In fact, we have Yk,N,T =
ON
[
x(k) Ax(k) . . . AT−Nx(k)
]
, from which
it follows that Rank (YN,T ) ≤ Rank (ON ). When
Rank (YN,T ) = Rank (ON ), we can completely reconstruct
the column space of ON from {y(k)}k∈N. This corresponds
to the full information scenario. However, since this is not
generally the case, we provide a bound in Proposition 2.2
on the Hankel information of the output data {y(k)}k∈N
generated from an initial state x(0). Before stating the
proposition, we first introduce the notion of excitability
index for the system 1.
Definition 1: (Excitability index) Let x ∈ Rn and N ∈ N,
and let EN (x) =
[
x Ax . . . AN−1x
]
. The excitability
index µ(x) of (1) at x is defined as
µ(x) = min{i : Rank (Ei(x)) = Rank (Ei+j(x)) ,∀j ∈ N}.
The excitability index of (1) is µ = maxx∈Rn µ(x). 
Proposition 2.2: (Hankel information bound on output
time series) Let {y(k)}k∈N be output of (1) from an initial
state x(0). Then, for any N,T ∈ N with N ≤ T , we have:
(i) Rank (YN,T ) ≤ minV⊆Ker⊥(ON ){dim(V) : x(0) ∈V;AV ⊆ V},
(ii) Γ ({y(k)}k∈N) ≤ min {νp, µ},
where YN,T and Γ ({y(k)}k∈N) are as defined in (4) and (5).
Proof: We start by noticing that
YN,T = ON
[
x(0) Ax(0) . . . AT−Nx(0)
]
,
from which it follows that Rank (YN,T ) ≤
Rank
([
x(0) Ax(0) . . . AT−Nx(0)
])
. Let V
be A-invariant, and let x(0) ∈ V ⊆ Ker⊥ (ON ).
Then, dim
({
x(0), Ax(0), . . . , AT−Nx(0)
}) ≤
dim (V). It then follows that Rank (YN,T ) ≤
Rank
([
x(0) Ax(0) . . . AT−Nx(0)
]) ≤ dim(V).
Since the above inequality holds for any A-invariant
V ⊆ Ker⊥ (ON ), the claim follows.
Moreover, we have Rank (ON ) ≤ Rank (Oν)
and Rank
([
x(0) Ax(0) . . . AT−Nx(0)
]) ≤
Rank
([
x(0) Ax(0) . . . Aµ−1x(0)
])
where ν
and µ are the observability and excitability indices
respectively. Moreover, we have Rank (YN,T ) =
dim
(
Ker⊥ (ON ) ∩ Col
([
x(0) Ax(0) . . . AT−Nx(0)
]))
.
Since dim
(
Ker⊥ (ON )
)
= dim (Col (ON )) ≤ min{νp, n},
dim
(
Col
([
x(0) Ax(0) . . . AT−Nx(0)
])) ≤ µ for any
N,T ∈ N and x(0) ∈ Rn, and we have µ ≤ n, we get
sup{Rank (YN,T ) : N,T ∈ N and N ≤ T} ≤ min {νp, µ}.
Proposition 2.2 implies that, if the initial state x(0) be-
longs to an A-invariant subspace of Ker⊥ (ON ) of lower di-
mension, then the column space of ON cannot be completely
characterized from the Hankel matrix YN,T , for any T ∈
N. Proposition 2.2 therefore characterizes an information
bound on {y(k)}k∈N. We now characterize the length of
the shortest time horizon over which {y(k)}k∈N attains the
Hankel information bound.
Theorem 2.3: (Minimum horizon length) Let {y(k)}k∈N
be the outputs of (1) from the initial state x(0). Then, for
any x(0) ∈ Rn and T0 ≥ ν + µ − 1, there exists N0 ∈ N
with N0 ≤ T0 such that:
Rank (YN0,T0) = Γ ({y(k)}k∈N) ,
where YN,T and Γ ({y(k)}k∈N) are as defined in (4) and (5).
Proof: For the Hankel matrix YN,T , we have
r = Np rows and let c be the number of columns. Then by
construction, we have T = N+c−1. Thus, we have YN,T =
ON
[
x(0) Ax(0) . . . Ac−1x(0)
]
, and Rank (YN,T ) =
dim
(
Ker⊥ (ON ) ∩ Col
([
x(0) Ax(0) . . . Ac−1x(0)
]))
.
We also have Ker⊥ (ON ) ⊆ Ker⊥ (Oν)
and Col
([
x(0) Ax(0) . . . Ac−1x(0)
]) ⊆
Col
([
x(0) Ax(0) . . . Aµ−1x(0)
])
for all
N, c ∈ N. Therefore, we get Ker⊥ (ON ) ∩
Col
([
x(0) Ax(0) . . . Ac−1x(0)
]) ⊆ Ker⊥ (Oν) ∩
Col
([
x(0) Ax(0) . . . Aµ−1x(0)
])
Thus, for
T0 ≥ ν + µ − 1, we can choose N0 = ν and c = µ
such that YN0,T0 attains maximum rank.
Theorem 2.3 states that for any initial state x(0), we attain
the Hankel information (upper) bound in Proposition 2.2
for the time series of outputs {y(k)}k∈N generated by the
system (1), within the finite time horizon {0, . . . , ν+µ−1}.
C. Data-driven attack detection monitor
For the nominal system under no attack (i.e., u ≡ 0), we
now seek to obtain a data-driven expression for the feature
space dynamics, as in (3). We factor the Hankel matrix
YN,T ∈ RpN×(T−N+1) by singular value decomposition to
obtain a matrix SN,T ∈ RpN×q whose column vectors are
the (orthonormal) left singular vectors of YN,T corresponding
to the non-zero singular values. The columns of SN,T can
be interpreted as the features in the output data {y(k)}T−1k=0
with a time window of size N . In the ensuing analysis, we fix
N , T and suppress them from the notation, hereby denoting
YN,T and SN,T simply by Y and S, respectively.
We now define feature vectors w(k) = S>yk:k+N−1 by
projecting the outputs yk:k+N−1, for k ∈ {0, . . . , T − N},
onto the feature space, and construct a matrix W as follows:
W =
 | | |w(0) w(1) . . . w(T −N)
| | |
 .
We then similarly construct a matrix ~W from output data
over a time horizon {1, . . . , T}, i.e., {y(k)}Tk=1, to get:
~W =
 | | |w(1) w(2) . . . w(T −N + 1)
| | |
 .
We show in Theorem 2.4 that, for T greater than the
minimum horizon length in Theorem 2.3, the nominal feature
vector sequence is obtained as a solution to w(k + 1) =
M∗w(k) for all k ∈ N, where M∗ ∈ Rq×q is a solution to
the following minimization problem:
M∗ = arg min
M∈Rq×q
‖ ~W −MW‖F , (6)
where ‖ · ‖F denotes the Frobenius norm. In the data-
driven analysis literature, this approach goes by the name of
Dynamic Mode Decomposition [18], and is closely related
to the Eigensystem Realization Algorithm [19] in the do-
main of system identification. Theorem 2.4 characterizes the
conditions under which the feature vector sequence offers a
complete characterization of the nominal output time series.
Theorem 2.4: (Data-driven feature space dynamics) For
N ≥ ν and T ≥ N + µ − 1, the feature vector sequence
{w(k)}k∈N generated by the (nominal) system (1) with u ≡
0 is a solution to w(k+ 1) = M∗w(k) for all k ∈ N, where
M∗ is given by (6). Moreover, the global minimizer in (6)
is M∗ = ~WW †, and the minimum value is 0.
The proof of Theorem 2.4 is provided in Appendix II. It
follows from Theorem 2.4 that, if the system is not under
attack over the time horizon {0, 1, . . . , T} with T ≥ ν+µ−1,
the feature vector sequence {w(k)}Tk=0 is a solution to
w(k + 1) = M∗w(k), where M∗ can be computed from
the (nominal) output sequence {y(k)}Tk=0 via the minimiza-
tion (6). This enables the prediction of the outputs starting at
time T+1, as yˆk:k+N−1 = Sw(k) for k ∈ {T−N+1, . . .}.
An attack detection scheme can therefore be defined based on
the prediction error, where the case yk:k+N−1 6= yˆk:k+N−1
is classified as Attack. Moreover, the maximum data-driven
attack detection capability is attained at time instant Tsafe =
ν + µ. In comparison, in the model-based setting attack
detection capability is attained at time Tmsafe = ν, where ν
is the observability index, as established in Theorem 2.1 and
discussed in Remark 1. We refer the reader to [2] for detailed
accounts on model-based attack monitor design.
Although attack detection capability can be attained at
Tsafe = ν+µ, it requires the construction of a Hankel matrix
of appropriate dimensions (with νp rows and µ columns).
However, since ν and µ are unknown in the data-driven
setting, achieving full detection capability at Tsafe = ν + µ
requires an algorithm to compute N , which is likely to
increase the time complexity of the monitor. We therefore
provide a practical data-driven heuristic in Remark 2 for
the choice of N , and an estimate in Theorem 2.5 for the
time T¯safe at which full attack detection capability is attained
for the heuristic.
Remark 2: (Data-driven choice of N ) Given a finite time
series of outputs over a time horizon {0, . . . , T − 1}, and
a window of size N , the Hankel matrix satisfies YN,T ∈
RpN×(T−N+1). In our heuristic algorithm, we select N to
satisfy T−N+1 ≥ pN , to maintain at least as many columns
as there are rows. This leads to the choice N =
⌊
T+1
p+1
⌋
. 
Theorem 2.5: (Safe time horizon length) Let {y(k)}k∈N
be the output of (1), let N(T ) =
⌊
T+1
p+1
⌋
, and let T¯safe ≥
max
{
ν(p+ 1)− 1, µ
(
p+1
p
)
− 1
}
. Then,
Rank
(
YN(T¯safe),T¯safe
)
= Γ ({y(k)}k∈N) ,
where YN,T and Γ ({y(k)}k∈N) are as defined in (4) and (5).
Proof: Following the arguments in the proof of The-
orem 2.3, the observability index ν yields a necessary
and sufficient lower bound on N , and we get a lower
bound on T by allowing
⌊
T+1
p+1
⌋
≥ ν. Moreover, the
excitability index yields a necessary and sufficient lower
bound on the number of columns as T − N + 1 ≥ µ.
Therefore, for a safe time horizon length T¯safe satisfying
T¯safe ≥ max
{
ν(p+ 1)− 1, µ
(
p+1
p
)
− 1
}
, we get that
Rank
(
YN(T¯safe),T¯safe
)
attains the maximum value.
We next characterize undetectable attacks for the data-
driven attack monitor. Notice that any attack over the time
horizon {0, . . . , ν+µ} is undetectable, since attack detection
capability is only attained at Tsafe = ν + µ. We therefore
restrict our attention to attacks starting at T ≥ Tsafe + 1.
Theorem 2.6: (Data-driven undetectable attacks) The (at-
tack) input u : N→ Rm to the system (1), with u0:T−1 = 0
for T ≥ Tsafe + 1 = ν +µ+ 1, is undetectable if and only if
uT :T+N−1 ∈ Ker (CN ) for all N ∈ N.
Proof: We have w(T − N) = S>yT−N :T−1 and
from the feature space dynamics, we get w(T −N + 1) =
M∗w(T −N), where M∗ is obtained from (6) over the time
horizon {0, . . . , Tsafe} and the predicted output over {T −
N + 1, . . . , T} is given by yˆT−N+1:T = Sw(T −N + 1) =
SM∗S>yT−N :T−1. It follows from (2) and Theorem 2.4
that the output prediction error yT−N+1:T − yˆT−N+1:T =
CNuT−N+1:T , where uT−N+1:T = (0, . . . , 0, u(T )). For
an undetectable attack, the prediction error yT−N+1:T −
yˆT−N+1:T = CNuT−N+1:T = 0, which implies that
uT−N+1:T ∈ Ker (CN ), i.e., u(T ) ∈ Ker (D). By induction,
we get that uT :T+N−1 ∈ Ker (CN ) for any N ∈ N.
Conversely, if uT :T+N−1 ∈ Ker (CN ) for any N ∈ N, we
see that the prediction error vanishes, which implies that the
attack is undetectable, thereby proving the claim.
III. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
We now present results from numerical experiments vali-
dating the key theoretical results presented in this letter and
comparing model-based and data-driven attack monitoring.
We considered a linear time-invariant system (1) of state-
space dimension n = 50 defined below:
A =
[
0(n−1)×1 In−1
−1 −11×(n−1)
]
,
with m = 5 actuators and p = 10 sensors. The columns
of B and the rows of C were distinctly chosen at random
from {ei}ni=1, the standard basis for Rn. The matrix D was
chosen to be the zero matrix.
We determined the values of the observability and ex-
citability indices numerically to be ν = 15 and µ = 50,
respectively. With the data-driven heuristic from Remark 2
we plot in Figure 1 the rank of the Hankel matrix YN(T ),T ,
Rank
(
YN(T ),T
)
as a function of T . We then designed
Fig. 1. The figure shows the plot of the rank of the Hankel matrix YN(T ),T
vs. time T with N chosen according to the data-driven heuristic from
Remark 2. We observe that Rank(YN(T ),T ) is a monotonically increasing
function of T , and a maximum rank of 50 is attained at T¯safe = 164. With
p = 10 and ν = 15 obtained numerically, we see that ν(p + 1) − 1 =
164 = T¯safe, which validates Theorem 2.5.
model-based and data-driven attack detection monitors based
on feature space dynamics (3) and as outlined in Section II-
C, respectively. We injected the system with an attack input
at the actuator j = 4 at T = 249 > T¯safe, such that
u4(249) = 1, and tracked the prediction error for the model-
based and data-driven attack detection monitors starting from
a random initial state, as shown in Figure 2.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this letter, we characterized the fundamental limitations
on data-driven monitoring of linear time-invariant systems
from a systems-theoretic perspective. In particular: (i) we
Fig. 2. The figure shows the responses of the model-based and data-
driven attack monitors for an attack input u4(249) = 1. Attack detection
capability for the model-based monitor is achieved at time T = 15 and
for data-driven monitor at time T¯safe = 164 (consistent with the result
in Figure 1) as seen from the convergence to zero of the prediction error,
implicitly validating Theorems 2.1 and 2.4. The attack is detected as an error
in the output prediction by the monitors at T = 249. We also observe that
the data-driven monitor recovers from the attack at around T = 270 when
the prediction error is below 0.03 units (< 3% of attack input magnitude)
and gradually decays to zero.
characterized an information bound on the output time series
and the minimum time horizon length for measurement data
collection to achieve detection capability; (ii) we provided
a heuristic for the choice of dimensions of the Hankel
matrix employed in data-driven attack detection; and (iii)
we obtained a characterization of undetectable attacks. Sur-
prisingly, our results show that model-based and data-driven
detection strategies share the same limitations, thus relaxing
the stringent assumption of the knowledge of the system
dynamics that is typically made in existing security works.
Future work includes the limitations of data-driven detec-
tion in stochastic, time-varying and nonlinear systems.
REFERENCES
[1] A. A. Ca´rdenas, S. Amin, and S. S. Sastry. Research challenges for
the security of control systems. In Proceedings of the 3rd Conference
on Hot Topics in Security, pages 6:1–6:6, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2008.
[2] F. Pasqualetti, F. Do¨rfler, and F. Bullo. Attack detection and identi-
fication in cyber-physical systems. IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, 58(11):2715–2729, 2013.
[3] Y. Chen, S. Kar, and J. M. F. Moura. Dynamic attack detection
in cyber-physical systems with side initial state information. IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, 62(9):4618–4624, 2016.
[4] S. Papadimitriou, J. Sun, and C. Faloutsos. Streaming pattern dis-
covery in multiple time-series. In Proc. of the 31st International
Conference on Very Large Data Bases, pages 697–708, 2005.
[5] D. Shi, Z. Guo, K. H. Johansson, and L. Shi. Causality counter-
measures for anomaly detection in cyber-physical systems. IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, 63(2):386–401, 2017.
[6] R. Hink, J. M. Beaver, M. A. Buckner, T. Morris, U. Adhikari, and
S. Pan. Machine learning for power system disturbance and cyber-
attack discrimination. In 7th International Symposium on Resilient
Control Systems, pages 1–8, 2014.
[7] M. Kravchik and A. Shabtai. Detecting cyber attacks in industrial
control systems using convolutional neural networks. In Proc. of
the ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and Privacy,
pages 72–83, 2018.
[8] J. Inoue, Y. Yamagata, Y. Chen, C. M. Poskitt, and J. Sun. Anomaly
detection for a water treatment system using unsupervised machine
learning. In IEEE International Conference on Data Mining Work-
shops, pages 1058–1065, 2017.
[9] J. Goh, S. Adepu, M. Tan, and Z. S. Lee. Anomaly detection in
cyber physical systems using recurrent neural networks. In IEEE 18th
International Symposium on High Assurance Systems Engineering
(HASE), pages 140–145, 2017.
[10] J. C. Willems, P. Rapisarda, I. Markovsky, and B. L. M. De Moor.
A note on persistency of excitation. Systems & Control Letters,
54(4):325–329, 2005.
[11] H. J. Van Waarde, J. Eising, H. L. Trentelman, and M. K. Camlibel.
Data informativity: a new perspective on data-driven analysis and
control. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2020.
[12] C. De Persis and P. Tesi. Formulas for data-driven control: Stabi-
lization, optimality and robustness. IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, 65(3):909–924, 2020.
[13] G. Baggio, V. Katewa, and F. Pasqualetti. Data-driven minimum-
energy controls for linear systems. IEEE Control Systems Letters,
3(3):589–594, 2019.
[14] Y. Liu, P. Ning, and M. K. Reiter. False data injection attacks
against state estimation in electric power grids. ACM Transactions
on Information and System Security, 14(1):1–33, 2011.
[15] Y. Mo and B. Sinopoli. False data injection attacks in electricity
markets. In IEEE Int. Conf. on Smart Grid Communications, pages
226–231, Gaithersburg, MD, October 2010.
[16] R. A. Horn and C. R. Johnson. Matrix Analysis. Cambridge University
Press, 1985.
[17] M. Sain and J. Massey. Invertibility of linear time-invariant dynamical
systems. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 14(2):141–149,
1969.
[18] J. H. Tu, C. W. Rowley, D. M. Luchtenburg, S. L. Brunton, and J. N.
Kutz. On dynamic mode decomposition: Theory and applications.
Journal of Computational Dynamics, 1(2):391–421, 2014.
[19] J-N. Juang and R. S. Pappa. An eigensystem realization algorithm
for modal parameter identification and model reduction. Journal of
Guidance, Control and Dynamics, 8(5):620–627, 1985.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 2.1
We have w(k + 1) = S(m,nom)
>ONx(k + 1) =
S(m,nom)
>ONAx(k). Suppose x(k) /∈ Ker (ON ), we get
that 0 6= ONx(k) ∈ Col (ON ) = Col
(
S(m,nom)
)
,
and we can express ONx(k) as a linear combina-
tion of the columns of S(m,nom). It then follows that
S(m,nom)
>ONx(k) 6= 0. Moreover, if x(k) ∈ Ker (ON ),
then we have S(m,nom)
>ONx(k) 6= 0. Therefore, we get
that Ker
(
S(m,nom)
>ON
)
= Ker (ON ).
We note that w(k) ∈ Col
(
S(m,nom)
>ON
) ∼=
Ker⊥
(
S(m,nom)
>ON
)
for all k ∈ N. We now
express x(k) ∈ Rn = Ker
(
S(m,nom)
>ON
)
⊕
Ker⊥
(
S(m,nom)
>ON
)
as x(k) = α(k) + β(k),
where α(k) ∈ Ker
(
S(m,nom)
>ON
)
and
β(k) ∈ Ker⊥
(
S(m,nom)
>ON
)
. We have w(k) =
S(m,nom)
>ONx(k) = S(m,nom)>ONβ(k). Since
S(m,nom)
>ON is a bijection from Ker⊥
(
S(m,nom)
>ON
)
to Col
(
S(m,nom)
>ON
)
, with
(
S(m,nom)
>ON
)†
as its
inverse, we get that β(k) =
(
S(m,nom)
>ON
)†
w(k).
Now, we have w(k + 1) =
S(m,nom)
>ONx(k + 1) = S(m,nom)>ONAx(k) =
S(m,nom)
>ONA (α(k) + β(k)) = S(m,nom)>ONAα(k) +
S(m,nom)
>ONAβ(k) = S(m,nom)>ONAα(k) +
S(m,nom)
>ONA
(
S(m,nom)
>ON
)†
w(k). Since
α(k) ∈ Ker
(
S(m,nom)
>ON
)
= Ker (ON ), we have
CAiα(k) = 0 for all i ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}. Now, if
N ≥ ν, the observability index of the system (1),
then we have Rank(ON ) = Rank(ON+1), and since
Ker(ON+1) ⊆ Ker(ON ), it follows from the Rank-Nullity
Theorem that Ker(ON ) = Ker(ON+1). We therefore get
that CANα(k) = 0, which implies that ONAα(k) = 0, or in
other words, Aα(k) ∈ Ker (ON ) = Ker
(
S(m,nom)
>ON
)
.
This is equivalent to stating that the Ker
(
S(m,nom)
>ON
)
is an invariant subspace of A when N ≥ ν, the
observability index of (1). Therefore, we get that
w(k + 1) =
(
S(m,nom)
>ON
)
A
(
S(m,nom)
>ON
)†
w(k).
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF THEOREM 2.4
We first recall that YN,T =
ON
[
x(0) Ax(0) . . . AT−Nx(0)
]
=[ONx(0) ONAx(0) . . . ONAT−Nx(0)] We have
w(k) = S>ONx(k) for all k ∈ N. Let x(k) = α(k) +β(k),
where α(k) ∈ Ker (S>ON) and β(k) ∈ Ker⊥ (S>ON).
We therefore get that w(k) = S>ONβ(k). Since S>ON is
a bijection from Ker⊥
(
S>ON
)
to Col
(
S>ON
)
, we have
that β(k) =
(
S>ON
)†
w(k).
Now, since N ≥ ν and T − N ≥ µ − 1,
we get from Theorem 2.3 that YN,T is of maximum
rank and we have w(k + 1) = S>ONx(k + 1) =
S>ONAx(k) = S>ONA (α(k) + β(k)) = S>ONAα(k) +
S>ONA
(
S>ON
)†
w(k).
Suppose α(k) ∈ Ker (ON ), and since N ≥ ν we get that
Ker (ON ) is A-invariant, and we get that Aα ∈ Ker (ON ),
or in other words, S>ONAα(k) = 0. Now suppose, on
the other hand, that α(k) ∈ Ker⊥ (ON ) ∩ Ker
(
S>ON
)
,
we would then indeed have x(k) ∈ Ker⊥ (ON ). Moreover,
let V ⊆ Ker⊥ (ON ) be the smallest A-invariant subset of
Ker⊥ (ON ) containing x(0). This implies that x(k) ∈ V ⊆
Ker⊥ (ON ). Since the columns of S form a basis of ONV ,
we get that ONx(k) can be expressed as a linear combination
of the columns of S, i.e., that ONx(k) = Sv(k), with v(k) 6=
0 and we get x(k) = O†NSv(k). It then follows that ONx(k)
does not have a component orthogonal to all the column
vectors of S, which implies that α(k) = 0 and we get a con-
tradiction. Therefore, α(k) /∈ Ker⊥ (ON ) ∩ Ker
(
S>ON
)
.
Thus, we get that w(k + 1) =
(
S>ON
)
A
(
S>ON
)†
w(k).
and we can write ~W =
(
S>ON
)
A
(
S>ON
)†
W . It is clear
from the above that Col
(
~W>
)
⊆ Col (W>), from which
we infer that
(
S>ON
)
A
(
S>ON
)†
= ~WW † is the global
minimizer for the minimization problem (6) and that the
minimum value is zero.
